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the Fragmented lok sabha:  
a case for electoral engineering
Bhaskar Dutta
Where there are numerous small political parties, as in 
India, the electoral system neither reflects the true views 
and opinions on important social and economic issues 
nor does it incorporate “social inclusiveness” . The 
fragmentation in our legislature can be corrected 
through appropriate electoral engineering. This study is 
an attempt to do so. It describes how the composition of 
the Lok Sabha has changed since 1967, paying particular 
attention to the trends in indices of fragmentation. It also 
discusses issues relating to the “ideal” composition of a 
legislature and of a government.
A country’s electoral system is a fundamental compo-nent of any democracy. Electoral laws convert votes into seats to determine the composition of legislative 
chambers, and hence, the type of government as well as the qual-
ity of governance in a country. Any electoral system should ide-
ally serve multiple objectives. First, it has to be “representative” 
– the composition of the legislature must reflect accurately the 
views and opinions of the electorate on important social and eco-
nomic issues in the country. In a divided society, this objective 
must also incorporate “social inclusiveness” by according repre-
sentation in the legislature to minorities. Second, it has to pro-
duce legislatures which are conducive to the formation of stable 
governments, which, in turn, should ensure good governance. 
Typically, this means that the legislature should not be too frag-
mented since the presence of a large number of small parties is 
not conducive to the formation of stable coalitional or single-
party governments. Third, the electoral system should also 
provide the electorate with the means to hold its representatives 
accountable by rewarding good politicians or political parties 
and punishing the bad ones.
It is well-recognised that no electoral system can satisfy these 
objectives since they are often conflicting. For instance, research 
on comparative electoral systems suggests that the more repre-
sentative an electoral system, the more likely is it to result in a 
fragmented legislature.1 Electoral systems which are based on 
some form of proportional representation typically produce legis-
latures where parties’ seat shares are closer to their vote shares 
compared to majoritarian systems such as the first-past-the-post 
(FPTP) system. Indeed, Duverger (1954) formulated this empi-
rical regularity into a proposition which has come to be called 
Duverger’s Law – majoritarian systems tend to produce two-
party systems while proportional systems are likely to result in 
multi-partyism.2 
So, the choice of an appropriate electoral system must typi-
cally involve some trade-offs amongst conflicting, and hence, 
competing objectives. The weights attached to different objec-
tives should depend upon the specific country environments – 
there is no “universal” principle which can dictate the choice of 
weights. Indeed, even in a given country, these weights can also 
change over time, if there are big changes in the country’s overall 
political environment since these changes will influence the rela-
tive importance of different objectives.
India has inherited the FPTP system from England, and we 
have been using this faithfully and without much public debate 
ever since elections have been held in independent India. During 
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the early years, successive elections returned the Congress Party to 
power with sizeable majorities to the Lok Sabha as well as various 
state assemblies. While the composition of the legislatures was not 
very representative – the Congress vote share typically fell sub-
stantially short of its seat share – the party was able to form stable 
governments. The year 1967 marked a watershed in Indian poli-
tics. The Congress Party suffered a sharp setback in both the par-
liamentary as well as the state assembly elections, and opposition 
parties and coalitions came to power in several major states. 
One consequence of the Congress setback was a vastly differ-
ent pattern of party representation in many of the state assem-
blies. There was a marked tendency towards multipartyism or 
fragmentation of legislatures with a proliferation of small parties 
and successful independent candidates. The fragmentation of 
legislatures resulted in loose and unstable alliances since com-
monality of ideology or purpose was more difficult to ensure 
amongst a large number of groups. 
Despite the fragmented state assemblies, the Lok Sabha con-
tinued to exhibit a relatively low level of fragmentation, and 
there was no problem in forming stable governments. The turn-
ing point came in 1989, when no single party could form a gov-
ernment on its own, and the government was formed by a coali-
tion led by the Janata Dal supported by the Left Front.3 However, 
this government lasted only one year. The Lok Sabha in 1991 was 
more fragmented. The Congress Party formed a minority govern-
ment, but managed to remain in power for the full term, with the 
help of several defectors acquired in December 1993. The subse-
quent years have witnessed substantially higher levels of frag-
mentation in the Lok Sabha.4 The nature of the ruling coalitions, 
typically a good indicator of the composition of the legislative 
chamber, has also changed. The number of parties in the coali-
tions has increased, with the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) 
coalition in 1999 having as many as 13 members, and the United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA) falling just short of that number.5 The 
compositions of the governments have also kept changing with 
some parties leaving the government, while others are induced 
to enter the government through various dubious means.
There have been disturbing signs of growing corruption in pub-
lic life, with allegations that some politicians, and the smaller par-
ties in particular, can be “bought off”. Unstable coalitions also im-
pose some economic costs. The unwieldy size of these coalitions 
and the complete absence of any ideological cohesion amongst their 
members have meant that these governments have found it diffi-
cult to agree on hard policy choices. Parties in the ruling coalitions 
have tried to implement policies catering to their own narrow vote 
banks, and have thus introduced various policy distortions.6
Of course, the increasing fragmentation in our legislative 
chambers simply reflects the growing divisiveness in our society. 
Caste, religion and ethnic divisions have all assumed greater sig-
nificance. New parties representing narrower interests have 
b ecome more popular, and have grown at the expense of national 
parties, whose vote and seat shares have recorded an alarming 
decline (see Table 3, p 97). This trend is only likely to become 
more pronounced in the immediate future. 
While social divisiveness is difficult to tackle, the fragmenta-
tion in our legislatures can be corrected through appropriate 
electoral engineering. Many countries which have adopted some 
form of proportional representation also specify a legal threshold 
representing the minimum percentage share of the vote that a 
party must obtain in the appropriate electoral district in order to 
secure a seat in the legislative chamber. This threshold, which 
varies from a low of 0.67% in the Netherlands to a high of 10% in 
Turkey, is designed to reduce party fragmentation by excluding 
small parties from the legislature. Obviously, the use of such a 
legal threshold is an artificial barrier against the entry of small 
parties and is in conflict with the goal of representation or social 
inclusiveness. However, countries which employ this device have 
deliberately chosen this in order to promote a more cohesive legi-
slature. In other words, these countries have traded off represen-
tation in favour of stable governance. 
Such legal thresholds are not used in countries which employ 
majoritarian electoral systems. But, this is probably because Duve-
rger’s Law applies to a much larger extent in these countries – of 
course with the notable exception of India. Hence, there is a signi-
ficantly greater concentration in parties’ seat shares in these coun-
tries even without the use of a threshold. Unfortunately, India’s 
recent electoral experience at the national level does not fit this 
pattern. Since there is no conceptual difficulty in applying the legal 
threshold to FPTP systems, there should certainly be greater discus-
sion about the desirability of using the legal threshold in India.
In the rest of this article, I first describe how the composition of 
the Lok Sabha has changed since 1967, paying particular atten-
tion to the trends in indices of fragmentation. I then go on to dis-
cuss issues relating to the “ideal” composition of a legislature and 
of a government. In the last section, I use recent electoral data to 
illustrate what the composition of the Lok Sabha might have been 
if we had a legal threshold of 2.5% – that is, a stipulation that only 
parties obtaining a minimum of 2.5% of the aggregate national 
vote are entitled to secure a seat in Parliament. Of course, this is a 
highly speculative exercise – if we did have such a legal require-
ment, then parties’ strategies as well as voters’ behaviour would 
have been different. Nevertheless, I believe this exercise is worth-
while because it provides some (even if imprecise) quantitative 
idea about the extent of change in fragmentation that might be 
achieved with this type of electoral reform. 
1 trends in composition of the lok sabha
In this section, I discuss characteristics related to the composi-
tion of the Lok Sabha since 1967 – as I have remarked earlier this 
year marked a watershed in the Indian political environment. 
Since the primary focus of the article is on the growing fragmen-
tation in the Lok Sabha since the 1990s, I compare the composi-
tion of the Lok Sabha for the years 1991, 1996, 1999 and 2004 to 
the years 1967, 1971 and 1977, these three years exhibiting 
r elatively low levels of fragmentation. 
table 1: Number of parties in lok sabha
Year 1967 1971 1977 1991 1996 1999 2004
Actual no of parties 20 25 18 24 28 38 37
Effective no of parties 3.16 1.86 1.91 3.60 5.82 5.87 6.52
Effective no of electoral parties 5.19 3.40 2.49 5.15 7.11 6.74 7.56
No of parties with less than five seats 10 16 11 15 13 22 21
No of independents 35 14 9 1 9 6 6
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Charts 1 to 7 and Table 1 (p 94) describe some features relating 
to the structure of parties in the Lok Sabha. There were 20 par-
ties actually gaining representation in Parliament in 1967. This 
number increased to 38 and 37, respectively, in 1999 and 2004. 
Not surprisingly, many of these parties were very small, with just 
one or two members. For instance, approximately a third of these 
parties had only one representative in Parliament, while over half 
the parties had less than five seats.
Charts 1 to 7 present a visual picture of the distribution of seats 
in the Lok Sabha for the years under review. Chart 1 shows that 
despite the first signs of fragmentation, the Congress in 1967 re-
tained its dominant role with 283 seats in a house of 520 mem-
bers. The Swatantra Party came a distant second with 44 seats. 
Another notable feature of the 1967 election was the large number 
of independents winning representation – as many as 35 of them! 
The dominance of the Congress was overwhelming in 1971, when 
Indira Gandhi swept to power capturing a two-thirds majority for 
her party. The next best was the CPI(M) with just 25 representatives 
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in Parliament. A common feature of the elections in 1977 and 
1991 was that the composition of the two Lok Sabhas was al-
most consistent with Duverger’s Law in the sense that the two 
largest parties captured a large fraction of the seats. Of course, 
this pattern was more pronounced in 1977, with the 1991 Lok 
Sabha being significantly more fragmented. Chart 4 also shows 
the emergence of a third force – the Janata Dal (JD) with just 
under 60 seats. The last three charts paint a very different 
picture – the aggregate share of the two largest parties falls quite 
sharply to around 300 or less. The remaining seats are distri-
buted among a large number of parties. 
The actual number of parties in Parliament can be a mislead-
ing indicator of the extent of fragmentation in a legislative cham-
ber, and the extent to which fragmentation acts as a constraint 
on the formation of stable governments. For instance, the pres-
ence of as many as 24 other parties did not prevent the Congress 
from forming a stable government in 1971. Similarly, as many as 
10 parties gained representation in the UK House of Commons in 
2001, but seven of these parties had only 28 seats amongst them, 
and so what mattered was the number of seats captured by the 
three main parties – Labour, Conservatives and Liberals. The con-
cept of the effective number of parties, due to Laakso and Taagepera 
(1979), conveys information about the extent of fragmentation in 
the legislature. This takes into account both the number of parties 
in the legislature as well as their seat shares. A benchmark is when 
two parties each capture 50% of the seats – in this case there are 
two effective parties. Smaller parties are given lower weight. The 
actual Laakso-Taagepera measure is given below. 
N = 1/ ΣS2i                     i  
where si is the share of seats won by party i in the legislature. A 
corresponding measure in terms of vote shares gives a measure 
of the effective number of electoral parties.7
Table 1 also shows both the effective number of parties as well 
as the effective number of electoral parties. The effective number 
of parties was 3.16 in 1967, reflecting the first sign of a fragmented 
Lok Sabha. The Congress and the Janata Party (JP) won large 
majorities in the next two general elections, and this kept the ef-
fective number of parties to below two. The second phase reveals 
a completely different picture. In particular, there has been an 
alarming increase in fragmentation in the last three Lok Sabhas 
with the effective number of parties being close to six. The effective 
number of electoral parties has always been higher than the effec-
tive number of parties. This reflects the fact that vote shares are 
usually more dispersed than seat shares under the FPTP system.
In order to put these charts in perspective, consider some inter-
national comparisons. Lijphart (1995) conducts a comparative 
analysis of election results in 27 countries between 1945 and 
1990. Belgium, Denmark, Israel and France are countries which 
typically have a high degree of fragmentation in their parlia-
ments. But, the average effective number of parties in these coun-
tries has ranged from 3.7 (Belgium) to 4.9 (France). The highest 
effective number of parties in Israel, a country which consist-
ently returns a large number of small parties to the Knesset, has 
been 6.0. Clearly, the 2004 Lok Sabha was highly fragmented in 
terms of any international comparison.
Another way of looking at the level of fragmentation is to con-
sider the Rae (1967) measure of fragmentation, which is a trans-
formation of the Laakso-Taagepera formula for the effective 
number of parties.8 In fact, it is given by
F = 1 – ΣSi
2
                       i 
so that F= 1 – 1/N. As earlier, si is the seat share of party i. An 
analogous expression in terms of vote shares gives the Rae index 
of fragmentation of votes. 
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Table 2 reports the Rae measure of fragmentation for both 
seats and votes. The table reports two sets of estimates. In the 
first set, the values of the indices are calculated as if there were 
no pre-poll alliances between different parties. In the second set 
of estimates, all major pre-poll alliances have been incorporated 
into the calculation of the index. Of course, the second set of esti-
mates indicates a lower level of fragmentation since seat and vote 
shares are consolidated amongst those groups of parties which 
successfully arrive at some pre-poll arrangements. 
A school of thought may claim that pre-poll alliances should be 
taken into account in any calculation of levels of fragmentation – 
if parties arrive at seat-sharing agreements, then they will act as 
one group in the legislature. But, of course, this assumption is not 
valid in India. Parties which come to some agreements about 
sharing seats in order to avoid splitting votes do not necessarily 
exhibit any commitment to remain in the same group or coalition 
after elections.9 The latest example of this was the decision of the 
Telangana Rashtra Samity, which was a constituent of the UPA 
coalition, but broke away from the UPA alliance in September 
2006. A more influential break-up was that of the All India Anna 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), whose departure from 
the NDA alliance actually resulted in the collapse of the 1998 NDA 
government after just a year. And there have been many other 
instances of parties breaking away from coalitions.
Of course, Table 2 again corroborates the alarming rise in the 
level of fragmentation since 1991. This rise in fragmentation is due 
entirely to the growth of state parties and the corresponding fall in 
vote and seat shares of national parties. In order to gain recogni-
tion as a state party, a party must be engaged in some form of 
political activity for at least five continuous years, and send at least 
4% of the state’s quota to the Lok Sabha or 3.33% of members to 
the state assembly. Alternatively, a party may gain recognition as a 
state party if it secures not less than 6% of the total votes in a state 
or national election. If a party is recognised in four or more states, 
it is automatically recognised as a national party by the EC.10
Table 3 describes distribution of seats and votes by category of 
parties. It shows that until 1991, the national parties won roughly 
nine out of 10 seats in the Lok Sabha. The vote share of national 
parties was of course lower, hovering around 80%. The sharp 
break came in 1996, when the seat share of national parties fell to 
74%. It dropped even further to 67% in the last two elections. The 
table also shows that almost the entire loss in seat shares of the 
national parties was captured by the state parties. This was the 
time when regional parties such as the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), 
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), Shiv Sena (SS), Samaj wadi 
Party (SP) and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) came into promi-
nence and became dominant players in their respective states. 
Since these were also amongst the larger states in the country, 
their vote shares were also significant at the national level. The 
category of unrecognised parties remained “small” players, cap-
turing around 3% of the seats in the last two elections. Typically, 
the FPTP system is biased against small parties, unless these 
parties’ vote banks are concentrated in a few constituencies. This 
is reflected in Table 3 – the vote shares of the unrecognised parties 
are appreciably larger than their seat shares.
There are different measures of the degree of disproportion-
ality between seat and vote shares. Here, I have used the measure 
due to Lijphart (1995). Letting di= (si-vi) denote the difference 
between seat share and vote share of party i, this is given by
          Σd2iL =    i               n√
Table 4 exhibits the values of the Lijphart index of dispropor-
tionality in the seven Lok Sabhas considered here. The highest 
level of disproportionality was in 1971, when the Congress won 
two-thirds of the seats in the Lok Sabha, but with only 43% of the 
votes. The levels of disproportionality in 1967 and 1997 were also 
higher than the corresponding levels in the remaining years. This 
is consistent with the properties of the FPTP system. Obviously, 
there is a large gap between votes and seats within each constitu-
ency since “the winner 
takes all”. If one party gets a 
majority of seats – as in 1967 
to 1977 – this tends to multi-
ply the single-constituency 
disparity between votes and 
seats by a large number. In 
contrast, if the legislature is 
fragmented, then the dis-
parities within each con-
stituency tend to cancel out to some extent leading to a smaller 
level of overall disproportionality. This explains why dispropor-
tionality is lower since 1991. It also illustrates the conflicting 
n ature of the two objectives of an electoral system – more frag-
mented legislatures tend to be more representative!
2 is there an ideal system of Governance?
The last section documents the dramatic increase in the number of 
parties gaining representation in the Lok Sabha, and the conse-
quent increase in fragmentation. This, in turn, has resulted in a 
large number of parties in the ruling coalition. An important aim  of 
any electoral reform designed to reduce the level of fragmentation 
table 2: the rae Fragmentation indices
 Ignoring Pre-poll Alliances Incorporating Pre-poll Alliances
 Seats Votes Seats Votes
1967 0.685 0.808  
1971 0.528 0.784 0.462 0.706
1977 0.619 0.706 0.475 0.598
1991 0.722 0.806  
1996 0.828 0.859 0.787 0.828
1999 0.830 0.852 0.747 0.780
2004 0.847 0.868 0.693 0.717
The indices have not calculated separately for 1967 and 1991 since there were no significant 
pre-poll alliances in these years.
table 3: seat and Vote shares by party categories (%)
 National State Unrecognised
 Seats Votes Seats Votes Seats Votes
1967 84.62 76.13 8.27 9.69 7.11 14.18
1971 87.07 77.85 7.72 10.16 5.21 11.99
1977 88.75 84.67 9.04 8.82 2.21 6.51
1991 89.51 80.61 9.55 13.10 0.94 6.29
 1996 74.22 69.08 23.76 22.44 2.02 8.48
1999 67.95 67.1 29.10 26.91 2.95 5.94
2004 67.04 62.89 29.28 28.90 3.68 8.21
table 4: Disproportionality index
 Lijphart   
 Disproportionality Index
1967 0.031
1971 0.051
1977 0.035
1991 0.021
1996 0.021
1999 0.020
2004 0.011
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must clearly be to reduce the number of parties gaining repre-
sentation. But, is there any rule of thumb which suggests the 
“ideal” number of parties in a legislature? Is single-party gov-
ernment necessarily better than coalition governments? Does 
received wisdom throw any light at all on these issues?
A conventional theory of electoral competition between par-
ties dating back to Downs (1957) supports a two-party system. In 
a rather stark model of the electoral environment, voters are rep-
resented on a left-right spectrum. Then, if there are only two par-
ties contesting the election, the parties would compete for the 
support of the centrist voters. Hence, both parties would support 
centrist policies, this tendency being stronger if a large propor-
tion of voters are located in the centre. On the other hand, there 
may no longer be any intense competition for centrist voters if 
there are more than two parties.
Of course, the representation of voters in a left-right spectrum 
essentially assumes that the issue space is one-dimensional. Even 
as a theoretical abstraction, this cannot be a very useful model in 
the Indian context since the issue space is significantly more com-
plicated. Caste, religion, cultural differences, the nature of eco-
nomic policies – all these influence voters’ preferences over politi-
cal parties, and so the issue space is really multidimensional. The 
electoral strategies that would be followed by two competing 
parties when the issue space is multidimensional no longer have 
any simple characterisation. 
Two-party competition also ensures that the government would 
be formed by a single party. Adversarial theories of electoral com-
petition emphasise the benefits of single-party governments. Pro-
ponents of adversarial democracy view elections primarily as a link 
in the chain designed to insure that parties in government remain 
collectively accountable to the legislative chamber, and hence, in 
one more step to the electorate. This vision suggests that electoral 
systems that systematically reduce the multiple contenders for of-
fice to the leading parties winning seats both simplifies electoral 
choices and clarifies responsibility for government decisions. 
So, the institution of single-party governments is supposed to 
promote accountability and transparency of decision-making. 
Voters can punish bad performance and conversely reward good 
performance since voters know exactly which party is responsi-
ble for any change. Since parties can anticipate voter behaviour, 
they, in turn, will act responsibly when in power because the in-
cumbent party fears being driven out of office if deemed to be 
corrupt or incompetent. 
An analogy sometimes drawn by economists to describe elec-
toral competition between different parties is that of Bertand oli-
gopoly. Just as several (identical) firms competing in prices drive 
prices down to marginal cost, political parties competing to cap-
ture power will also extract zero rent if either captures power. 
However, the different parties may be distinguishable in terms of 
ideologies or differences in the personal charisma of their leaders. 
In this case, the analogy of Bertrand competition between identi-
cal firms is no longer appropriate. Nevertheless, electoral competi-
tion will still mitigate rent extraction.11 However, the implicit as-
sumption in this argument is that of a single-party government 
since this facilitates identification of the parties which are culpa-
ble when there is excessive rent extraction from the system.
The dangers of single-party governments are also well known. 
An obvious problem is that it may lead to a dictatorship of the ma-
jority. The entrenched power of the majority population may result 
in the disregard of minority rights, and more generally, an absence 
of effective checks and balances that prevent extremism of any 
form, even though the extremism may have the support of a major-
ity of the electorate. For instance, a coalition government would 
almost certainly not have been able to introduce the Emergency!
There are also supporters of consensus democracy, who envis-
age this form as a guard against the excesses of single-party gov-
ernments. Thus, the vision of consensus democracy emphasises 
that political institutions should promote consensual decision-
making, bargaining and compromise among multiple parliamen-
tary parties, each of whom have some stake in power. This, of 
course, means at least some dispersion in decision-making pro-
cesses. Proponents of consensus democracy suggest that in order 
to facilitate deliberative and collaborative governance, the elec-
toral system should reduce the barriers to minority parties, max-
imise voter turnout, and ensure that parliaments faithfully mir-
ror the social and political diversity in society. These act as the 
checks and balances which are so completely absent in single-
party governments. For instance, the Bharatiya Janata Party 
(BJP) has been unable to implement policies which incorporate 
extreme versions of its Hindutva philosophy only because it was 
in a coalition government. Luckily, at least some of the other 
member of the coalition did not subscribe to the same philoso-
phy, forcing the BJP to tone down its extremism. 
In the foreseeable future, we will have a coalition government 
at the centre. So, the debate is not really about the relative bene-
fits and costs of single-party versus coalition governments. A 
more relevant discussion must centre around the costs and bene-
fits of different types of coalition governments – all multiparty 
governments cannot be painted with the same brush. 
For instance, there is a difference in the duration of different 
types of coalition governments, although their average duration is 
typically lower than that of single-party governments. The life of 
an average Italian government in the post-second world war has 
been just one year, while majority coalition governments in sev-
eral other countries in western Europe have lasted significantly 
longer.12 The Indian experience with coalition governments is also 
varied. The Left Front governments in West Bengal have had no 
problem in lasting full terms in office, while coalition governments 
in several other states have collapsed like the proverbial house of 
cards. The central governments of 1989 and 1998 had very short 
lives, while those in 1999 and 2004 lasted their full terms. Al-
though the central governments of 1999 and 2004 are exceptions, 
the average duration of coalition governments tends to be nega-
tively correlated with the number of parties in the coalition.13 
Greater ideological disparity amongst members of the ruling coali-
tion also tends to reduce the life of a coalition government. 
Unstable governments that are likely to have a short life are 
l iable to introduce policy distortions. Such governments have 
very short time-horizons. This has important implications for 
economic policy in general, and budgetary policy in particular. If 
political power alternates rapidly and randomly between competing 
political parties or groups of parties, then each government will 
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follow myopic policies since it assigns a low probability to being 
relocated. Hard policy options whose benefits flow after a long 
gestation lag are unlikely to be adopted by such a government. It 
may spend indiscriminately in order to satisfy the short-term 
needs of its support groups. 
Ruling coalitions with a large number of ideologically disparate 
members are also likely to introduce policy distortions, even if 
these governments have a long life. There are very few policy 
changes which are beneficial for everyone – some group is always 
affected adversely. The party whose specific vote bank is hurt will 
then oppose the change since the credit is shared amongst all the 
constituents of the coalition. So, very few policy initiatives will be 
undertaken by such coalitions. On the other hand, each constituent 
will also promote spending on projects catering to the interests of 
its own group of supporters leading to overall excessive expenditure. 
3 electoral engineering
Clearly, a large number of parties in the ruling coalition is an em-
barrassment of riches. Given the cleavages in the contemporary 
Indian society, the only way to restrict the size of coalitions is to 
artificially promote a greater concentration of parties in the legis-
latures by ensuring that only relatively big parties gain representa-
tion in Parliament. Of course, any such attempt is a violation of 
one of the principal objectives of an electoral system – the need to 
be representative. But, as I have mentioned earlier, there is no ideal 
electoral system. Trade-offs between different objectives have to 
be exercised, and changes in the relative weights must depend on 
the extent to which the current electoral system falls short of dif-
ferent objectives. Since the possibility of stable governance seems 
very remote, the case for a realignment of weights in favour of 
stable governance seems overwhelmingly strong. 
It is also worth pointing out that several other countries have 
implemented major reforms of the basic electoral system. In the 
United Kingdom, the Blair government radically overhauled the 
electoral system of FPTP, with alternative systems adopted at 
a lmost every level except for Westminster and local councils. 
After more than a century of the FPTP system, New Zealand 
switched to a mixed-member proportional system, produ cing a 
sudden fragmentation of the two-party system in 1993. In 1992, 
Israel introduced direct elections for the prime minister in order 
to create a stronger executive as a direct response to the increas-
ing party fragmentation in the Knesset and overcome the prob-
lems of frequent government turnover. Italy went in for electoral 
engineering in the following year. After prolonged debate about 
the best way to overcome unstable party governments, and a 
deep crisis in the parliamentary system, Italy adopted a combined 
electoral system where three-quarters of the parliamentary seats 
were distributed by plurality vote in single member districts and 
the remaining one-quarter as a proportional compensation for 
minor parties. Venezuela, one of Latin America’s oldest democra-
cies, aiming to strengthen the independence of elected members 
over the national party leadership, changed in 1993 from a closed 
list proportional representative (PR) system for the Chamber of 
Deputies to a combined system. In March 1994, Japan moved 
from a Single Non-Transferable Vote to a system combining PR 
seats with FPTP-single-member districts, in the attempt to craft a 
competitive two-party, issue-oriented politics, and a cleaner, 
more efficient government.14
An interesting response to government instability is the 
German system of “constructive vote of no-confidence”. That is, 
the German legislature or Bundestag can remove the chancellor 
only when it simultaneously agrees on a successor. The construc-
tive no-confidence vote makes it harder to remove a chancellor 
because opponents of the chancellor not only must disagree with 
his or her governing, but also must agree on a replacement. 
Notice that while such a rule increases government stability as 
measured by duration of government, it may not help in promot-
ing better governance when a ruling coalition consists of ideo-
logically disparate groups. The factors responsible for policy dis-
tortions in the form of policy inaction and populism are not really 
mitigated simply by prolonging the life of the government. So, 
any attempt to produce better governance must tackle the problem 
of fragmentation in the Lok Sabha.
Suppose a legal threshold was superimposed on the FPTP system 
in India. In particular, suppose that in each Lok Sabha constitu-
ency, the winner is the candidate who secures the largest number 
of votes from amongst those candidates belonging to parties 
obtaining at least 2.5% of the aggregate votes at the national 
level.15 Notice that this would eliminate all independents and 
small parties from the electoral contest, and thereby ensure a 
significantly lower degree of fragmentation in Parliament.
I now describe an illustrative exercise of imposing such a 2.5% 
threshold on the actual electoral date for the Lok Sabha elections 
in the years 1991, 1996, 1999 and 2004. For each of these years, 
Table 5 presents some characteristics of a hypothetical Lok Sabha 
in which parties securing less that 2.5% of the aggregate votes 
are denied representation. In this exercise, I have treated the Left 
Front as a single “party” since the constituents of this Front have 
exhibited much greater unity of purpose than any other pre-poll 
alliance. So, for instance, only the Congress, BJP, Left Front, JD, 
JP and TDP would have gained representation in 1991. Their com-
bined vote share adds up to 84%, and together these parties ob-
tained 494 seats. As many as 18 parties obtaining 40 seats are 
eliminated. Of course, this reduces fragmentation considerably. 
Table 5 shows that the effective number of parties goes down to 
just over three, while the Rae index is just .673.
The 1996 hypothetical Lok Sabha would have seen the exit of 
the JP and entrance of two new parties – the SP and Bahujan 
S amajwadi Party (BSP). Since the actual fragmentation in 1996 was 
considerably higher, the vote shares of these seven parties add up 
to only 76%, while their aggregate seats are 443. The divergence 
of the hypothetical Lok Sabhas from the actual Lok Sabhas (in 
terms of the combined vote shares and seat shares) goes up in 
1999 and 2004. Of course, this in itself reflects the higher level of 
fragmentation in the actual Lok Sabhas – a larger number of 
table 5: simulated party characteristics with 2.5% legal threshold
 1991 1996 1999 2004
No of eligible parties 6 7 9 6
Effective no of parties 3.06 3.85 3.91 3.57
Effective no of electoral parties 3.58 4.11 4.26 3.67
Fragmentation index (seats) 0.673 0.740 0.744 0.720
Fragmentation index (votes) 0.721 0.757 0.765 0.727
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small parties are eliminated in the latter two years. The effective 
number of parties in both years remains below four – compared 
to 5.87 and 6.52 in the actual Lok Sabhas.
Of course, this is only indicative of what might have happened 
if we actually did have a legal threshold incorporated in our elec-
toral rules. Any such change would have obviously resulted in big 
changes in both party strategies as well as voter behaviour. 
Clearly, there would have been some consolidation of parties 
since the smaller parties would have merged in order to ensure 
that their aggregate vote share crossed the legal threshold. Some 
voters too would have changed the parties for whom they cast 
their votes. Instead of “wasting” their votes on their preferred but 
“small” parties, they would have voted for their most preferred 
“large” party. But, notice that both tendencies would have worked 
in the same and desired direction – to reduce fragmentation!
How unfair is such a system to minorities? The answer to this 
question depends on what constitutes an “eligible” issue in the 
national election. Consider, for instance, the issue of the rele-
vance of caste in Indian elections. However much “liberal”, 
Indians may object to the introduction of caste as an issue in elec-
toral contests, it does seem to be an important issue with a large 
segment of the electorate. So, if the restrictions were so severe as 
to rule out all dalit parties, that would certainly be a gross viola-
tion of minority rights. On the other hand, it is a less serious vio-
lation of minority rights, if dalits or Yadavs in a specific state are 
denied representation by their own state parties. Often, the only 
unique selling proposition (USP) of many of these parties is the 
personal charisma of their leaders. 
Similarly, several parties have all gained prominence because 
they represent specific regional interests. These parties need to 
be distinguished from parties which fight for greater decentrali-
sation through increased regional autonomy. For instance, re-
gional parties which represent the interests of narrow geogra-
phical areas may often be inimical to the interests of the country 
as a whole. A prime example of this is the Shiv Sena with its agi-
tation for “sons of the soil”. The growing number of states in India 
is also a manifestation of this brand of regionalism. 
Any effort to reduce fragmentation must also reduce the di-
mension of the issue space. There is a sense in which the imposi-
tion of a legal threshold does this endogenously by forcing parties 
with similar though not identical interests to merge. For instance, 
there could be parties representing the interests of all dalits or of 
all other backward classes irrespective of their geographical loca-
tion. Similarly, there can be a party which fights for greater re-
gional autonomy bitterly opposed to another which is in favour of 
greater centralisation. There can be parties differentiated on the 
left-right spectrum in terms of economic policies. Essentially, 
each political party should be viewed as a mechanism to aggre-
gate diverse points of view. Minorities within each party will 
have no one to represent them, and in the process their rights 
may be violated. But, then, even today, tiny parties representing 
very narrow interests have very little influence on the overall 
p olicymaking apparatus. 
The use of a legal threshold – whether this is superimposed on a 
proportional electoral system or majoritarian system – represents 
“some” violation of the objective of representation and social inclu-
siveness. This represents the cost of such electoral reform. The benefit 
or gain would be greater consolidation of parties in the Lok Sabha, 
and hence, better governance. In the current Indian political envi-
ronment, the gains are more than likely to outweigh the costs. 
Notes
 1 See, for instance, the classic work of Rae (1967) 
and Norris (2004).
 2 It is also recognised that the recent Indian politi-
cal environment, particularly at the national level, 
is a robust violation of Duverger’s Law!
 3 Yadav (1999) has an interesting classification of 
the overall electoral scene in India, and labels the 
post-1989 period as the third electoral system. 
 4 See Sridharan (2002) for alternative explanations 
of why the Lok Sabha is increasingly fragmented 
over time.
 5 Here, I am departing from the conventional 
definition of a “coalition” in the political science 
literature, which counts only lower house 
parties with ministers in the cabinet as being 
members of the ruling coalition. So, for instance, 
the TDP would not be included in the NDA 
c oalition since it provided external support to the 
government.
 6 There is some empirical corroboration that unsta-
ble coalitions introduce policy distortions. Roubi-
ni and Sachs (1989) analyse the pattern of fiscal 
deficits in member countries of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
They find a significant tendency for larger deficits 
in countries characterised by short average ten-
ure of government and by the presence of many 
parties in the ruling coalition.
 7 This term is due to Lijphart (1995). 
 8 The underlying idea of a measure of fragmenta-
tion is that it is the opposite of a measure of con-
centration. The Rae index of fragmentation is 
based on the Herfindahl-Hirshman index of 
industrial concentration.
 9 One notable exception is the constituents of the 
Left Front. 
10 There have been some changes in the definition of 
a “national” party. However, the qualitative 
n ature of the trends reported in Table 3 are not 
affected by these changes. 
11  See, for instance, Persson and Tabellini (2000).
12  See, for instance, Taylor and Herman (1971), L aver 
and Schofield (2000).
13  See Taylor and Herman (1971), who find that the 
Rae index of fragmentation of the legislative 
chamber is negatively correlated with the dura-
tion of coalition governments.
14  Of course, many democracies have also imple-
mented more minor changes in their electoral 
systems by modifying electoral procedures so as 
to change the legal statutes and party rules and 
facilitate positive action for women and improv-
ing the administrative process of electoral regis-
tration and voting facilities. 
15  I am abstracting from the problem of what would 
happen if in some constituency, no eligible party 
puts up a candidate. In practice, if we did have 
such a system in place, then the “equili brium” 
r esponse of parties would ensure that there would 
be eligible candidates in each c onstituency.
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